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723 
CALLING THE BOSS OR CALLING THE PRESS:  
A COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN 
RESPONSES TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
WHISTLEBLOWING 
When Time magazine asked former ―Person of the Year‖1 and 
WorldCom whistleblower, Cynthia Cooper, if she would blow the whistle 
again, she replied, ―Yes, I would. I really found myself at a crossroads 
where there was only one right path to take.‖2 While Cooper believed that 
there was only ―one right path to take,‖ many other whistleblowers do not 
know what to do when they find themselves at such a crossroads. A 
potential whistleblower faces a difficult choice: she can either stick her 
neck out and report misconduct, risking potential retaliation from her 
employer, or she can keep quiet, keep her job and keep her employer‘s 
misconduct hidden.  
Deciding whether to report, however, is only one fork in the road to 
blowing the whistle. After the whistleblower decides to disclose her 
employer‘s wrongdoing, she finds herself at a second crossroads: she now 
must select her avenue of reporting. She can either blow the whistle 
internally to her employer, or externally.
3
 Her chosen path, whether 
internal or external, is critical in the American and British systems of 
whistleblower protection, as it determines what level of protection the 
whistleblower is granted. The American system gives greater protection to 
external reports, while the British system fiercely protects internal reports. 
Thus, contrary to Cooper‘s aforementioned assertion, the difference 
between American and British preferences for reporting avenues 
demonstrates that there is not a universal ―right path‖ to whistleblowing. 
In this Note I will argue that there need not be ―one right path.‖ Rather, a 
model whistleblower protection law would not heavily favor either 
external or internal reporting; it would offer protection to both types of 
 
 
 1. On Dec. 30, 2002 Time magazine named three whistleblowers its ―Persons of the Year.‖ The 
other two whistleblowers named ―Persons of the Year‖ were Sherron Watkins, the Enron 
whistleblower, and Coleen Rowley, the FBI whistleblower. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, 
Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 30.  
 2. Amanda Ripley, Q & A: Whistle-Blower Cynthia Cooper, TIME, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www. 
time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1709695,00.html. 
 3. While an internal report ensures that the corporation has a chance to remedy the misconduct 
before it is publicly released, an employer who receives a report might be able to retaliate against the 
whistleblower without sanction. Thus, while external reporting might be perceived as ―airing out‖ the 
corporation‘s dirty laundry, such a report might also ensure that a corporation takes its internal 
complaints seriously, and that it has a sound procedure for receiving them. For a more detailed 
discussion of these points, see infra notes 100–08 and accompanying text.  
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reports in certain instances. My proposed hybrid model would allow for 
the appropriate balance between internal and external reporting, while still 
ensuring that the whistleblower does not find herself at a dead end.  
Part I of this Note will examine American whistleblower protections, 
specifically focusing on the federal statutory
4
 and common law protections 
afforded to public and private employees. Part II will examine British 
whistleblower protections focusing on the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
(―PIDA‖). In Part III, I will examine the preferences for, and benefits of, 
internal and external reporting. Finally, in Part IV, I will suggest a hybrid 
model of whistleblower protection that would give whistleblowers clearer 
guidance regarding which avenue of reporting is preferable, and would 
provide more appropriate protections for internal and external reports vis-
à-vis the current American and British models.  
I. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 
America has a convoluted ―patchwork‖5 of whistleblower protections 
for private and public employees. Yet despite the incomprehensibility of 
much of American whistleblower law, it still clearly favors external 
reporting.  
A. Common Law Protections for the American Private Employee 
While common law protections for the privately employed American 
whistleblower are limited, the law still evinces a slight preference for 
external reporting. American common law protection is limited largely 
because of the at-will employment doctrine.
6
 Recognizing the harshness of 
the American rule of at-will employment, specifically in the whistleblower 
 
 
 4. Individually, states also have common law and statutory protections for American 
whistleblowers. For brevity, and in order to ensure that this Note provides a proper analog for the 
British statutory scheme, this Note will only focus on federal whistleblower protections. For a 
comprehensive study of state whistleblower statutes, see Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower 
Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581 (1999). 
 5. According to one American whistleblower scholar, Tom Devine, ―the overall premise for US 
whistleblower law is chaos.‖ Tom Devine, Whistleblowing in the United States, in WHISTLEBLOWING 
AROUND THE WORLD: LAW, CULTURE AND PRACTICE 74, 83 (Richard Calland & Guy Dehn eds., 
2004). He continues, ―[U]nlike the consistent set of rules for all corporations and government workers 
relying on British . . . whistleblower statutes, the unstructured growth of US whistleblower law is 
saturated with arbitrary inconsistencies and contradictions.‖ Id. 
 6. Under this doctrine, there is a presumption that both the employee and the employer can 
terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any reason. See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 
81 Tenn. 507 (Tenn. 1884). The Payne court, which founded this doctrine, specifically held that an 
employee who is not under a fixed term contract can be fired at will, and that the employer can 
condition the employee‘s employment on anything he wishes. Id.  
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context, courts began limiting the employers‘ ability to terminate 
whistleblowers under the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.
7
 
The whistleblowing public policy exception ―protects employees fired 
for reporting or complaining about their employer‘s unlawful acts.‖8 
Whistleblower claims, however, are typically only protected under this 
public policy exception if the employee reports misconduct that implicates 
threats to public health and safety.
9
 For example, in Hayes v. Eateries, 
Inc.
10
 an employee was fired after he reported
11
 and attempted to 
investigate another employee‘s attempt to embezzle from his employer.12 
The court held that it did not matter whether the Hayes employee reported 
internally or externally, he still had not reported pursuant to ―a clear and 
compelling public policy.‖13  
 
 
 7. While the enforcement and application of the public policy exception to the at-will 
employment rule are largely state determined, this exception has been recognized in the federal court 
system. Accordingly, while the reader should note that this doctrine is largely state created and state 
enforced, the public policy exception still has had a large impact within federal whistleblower 
protection. 
 This public policy exception to the at-will rule of employment was first recognized in 1959 in the 
case of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
The Petermann court specifically noted that ―[i]t would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and 
contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee, whether 
the employment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the ground that the employee declined 
to commit perjury . . . .‖ Id. at 27. 
 The public policy exception protects four basic categories of cases. It can be used to seek redress 
for adverse employment actions when employees are fired for refusing to do an illegal act, see 
Petermann, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), when the employee is fired for claiming a public 
right, see Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973), where an employee is 
fired for fulfilling a public duty, see Nees v. Hock, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975), and where an employee is 
fired for whistleblowing. 
 8. MARION G. CRAIN, PAULINE T. KIM, & MICHAEL SELMI, WORKLAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 188 (1st ed. 2005). 
 9. Id. at 193. Examples of successful whistleblower claims that were framed as public policy 
cases include White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1990) and Garibaldi v. Lucky 
Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984). In White, two plaintiffs alerted their employer to the 
fact that there were some flaws in their plant‘s brake installation procedures. White, 908 F.2d at 671. In 
Garibaldi, a milk truck driver noticed that some of the milk that he was carrying was spoiled and he 
reported this violation. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1368. 
 10. 905 P.2d 778 (Okla. 1995). 
 11. The facts of Hayes do not note whether the Hayes plaintiff internally or externally reported 
his employer‘s misconduct. But, the court notes that regardless of the avenue of the reporting chosen, 
there was no clear and compelling public policy at stake when the Hayes plaintiff reported spoiled 
food and improper food labeling. Id. at 785–86. 
 12. Id. at 780. 
 13. See supra note 11. This case exemplifies the relative futility of arguing a whistleblower case 
under the public policy exception, and demonstrates the early common law‘s belief that the avenue of 
reporting did not matter. The court noted:  
In our view, neither external reporting, i.e. to outside law enforcement officials, or internal 
reporting, i.e. to company officials, of the crime of embezzlement from the employer, is 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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While the Hayes court did not favor either internal or external 
reporting, jurisdictions recognizing the public policy exception to the at-
will rule often dismiss cases where an employee only internally reports 
wrongdoing
14
 on the theory that internal reporting ―does not further the 
public interest of detection and enforcement.‖15 Such internal reporting is 
also often discouraged because it disrupts an employer‘s unfettered 
discretionary control of his workplace.
16
 Nonetheless, a limited minority 
of courts still extend common law protection to purely internal reports.
17
 
The First Amendment sometimes provides an additional source of 
common law whistleblower protection for the private sector employee.
18
 
Although First Amendment protection is traditionally only granted to 
public employees, private employees have received First Amendment 
protection, successfully arguing that this amendment is a valid source of 
 
 
imbued with the necessary clear and compelling public policy sufficient to protect the 
employee from discharge . . . . 
 Although we believe most people, including the members of this Court, would agree that, 
generally speaking, the reporting of crimes to appropriate law enforcement officials should be 
lauded and encouraged, and that an employee‘s reporting to appropriate company officials of 
crimes committed by co-employees against the interests of the employer is a likewise 
commendable endeavor, we must decide in this case whether the reporting of this particular 
crime against this particular victim . . . is so imbued with a clear and compelling public policy 
such that a tort claim is stated if the employer discharges the employee for so reporting. In our 
view, such reporting is not so protected.  
Id. at 786. 
 14. Orly Lobel, Legal Loyalties 13 (Oct. 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author; 
published in modified form in Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of 
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433 (2009). 
 15. Id. (citing Brown v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 1984)). See also House v. 
Carter-Wallace, 556 A.2d 353, cert. denied, 564 A.2d 874 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Geary v. 
United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); and Fox v. MCI Commc‘ns Corp., 931 P.2d 857 
(Utah 1997). These cases underscore the public policy exception‘s preference, if not requirement, for 
external reporting. 
 16. Lobel, supra note 14, at 13. This belief that internal reporting might disrupt an employer‘s 
workforce is further addressed in this Note, in the section detailing First Amendment common law 
protection afforded to public employees and also later in Part III, which compares the benefits of 
internal and external reports. 
 17. Id. at 14. Lobel comments that ―some courts have explicitly rejected the external/internal 
distinction‖ and some courts ―extend protection to internal reporting in order to eliminate perverse 
incentives to ‗bypass internal channels altogether and immediately summon police.‘‖ Id. (citing 
Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1991)). Yet the overt preference for external 
whistleblowing is underscored by Elleta Sangrey Callahan and Terry Morehead Dworkin who noted 
that public policy cases ―strongly suggest that an internal whistleblower is substantially less likely to 
prevail on the basis of [a public policy] claim than one who discloses information to a government 
agency.‖ Elleta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the Media, 
and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 160 (1994). 
 18. CRAIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 480–82. First Amendment whistleblower protection usually 
applies only to public employees because of the Constitution‘s state action requirement. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/6
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public policy in its own right.
19
 Jurisdictions are mixed, however, 
regarding whether the Constitution is a valid source of public policy and, 
accordingly, whether the First Amendment can support a whistleblowing 
public policy exception claim. Only a handful of courts have ever afforded 
private employees First Amendment protection, and even when courts 
have recognized the First Amendment as a source, they have reasoned that 
the First Amendment‘s state action requirement is not met in a private 
employment relationship.  
As with the traditional public policy exception cases, the First 
Amendment cases in the private sector demonstrate American 
ambivalence towards preferring internal or external avenues of reporting, 
leaving the private sector employee with little guidance regarding who he 
should report to should his employer commit malfeasance. Unfortunately, 
the landscape of whistleblower protection for public employees in the 
United States is no less convoluted. 
B. Common Law Protections for the American Public Employee 
As opposed to common law protection for the privately employed 
whistleblower, the common law protections for public employees are 
extensive
20
 and explicitly favor external reporting. The First Amendment 
is the primary source of common law protection for public employee 
whistleblowers.  
The First Amendment was established as a source of whistleblower 
protection for public employees in the landmark case of Pickering v. 
Board of Education.
21
 In this case, the Supreme Court held that a public 
school teacher could not be fired for speaking out on issues of public 
 
 
 19. For instance, the court in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) 
held that the Constitution can be a source of public policy, implying that a private employee who 
exercises his First Amendment rights by speaking out against his employer might have a 
whistleblower claim under the public policy exception. This implication, however, has been explicitly 
rejected by another line of cases exemplified by Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 75 P.3d 733 
(Idaho 2003). Rejecting the reasoning of Novosel, the court in Edmondson held that the Constitution 
was not a valid source of public policy. Justice Walters, speaking for the majority declared that:  
[T]he public policy adopted in Novosel has not been endorsed by any other court, not even the 
Pennsylvania state courts within the federal district of the Circuit that issued Novosel. . . .  
 Accordingly, we hold that an employee does not have a cause of action against a private 
sector employer who terminates the employee because of the exercise of the employee‘s 
constitutional right of free speech. 
Id. at 738–39.  
 20. This is because public employers meet the Constitution‘s state action requirement that private 
employers cannot meet. 
 21. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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concern.
22
 The resulting Pickering test requires that courts balance 
whether the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, against the employer‘s need for control and harmony in his 
workplace, when deciding if a termination based on the employee‘s 
comments violated the employee‘s First Amendment rights.23 Connick v. 
Myers
24
 subsequently amended this Pickering test in 1983 by adding a 
threshold requirement that the employee be speaking on a matter of public 
concern before the Pickering balancing test could even be applied.
25
 
Together, Pickering and Connick established that ―employees speak on 
matters of public concern [sufficient for whistleblower protection] when 
they report dereliction of public duties, corruption, or threats to public 
health and safety.‖26 While this public concern test affords whistleblowers 
some protection, this requirement has also effectively denied protection to 
employees who report what a court deems are ―grievances or criticism 
concerning workplace conditions.‖27 First Amendment whistleblower 
protection, therefore, inherently discourages internal whistleblowing since 
any sort of internal grievance might be viewed as just that—not as speech 
on a matter of public concern.  
This explicit disdain for internal reporting was echoed in a recent First 
Amendment case, Garcetti v. Ceballos.
28
 Known by some as ―the worst 
whistleblower decision,‖29 Garcetti essentially held that ―when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
30
 the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and 
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.‖31 
 
 
 22. Specifically, Pickering was a schoolteacher who was dismissed after he wrote a letter to the 
local newspaper which criticized the Board of Education‘s allocation of funds. Id. at 564. 
 23. The Supreme Court opined that in determining a public employee‘s rights of free speech, the 
Court must ―arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.‖ Id. at 568. 
 24. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 25. Id. at 146. 
 26. Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 115 
(1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 27. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 28. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 29. See Lobel, supra note 14, at 17 (citing David G. Savage, Supreme Court Limits Free Speech 
in Workplace for Public Employees, SEATTLE TIMES, May 31, 2006, at A1). 
 30. Official duties are job duties. For example, in Garcetti, writing a legal memorandum was 
considered an ―official duty‖ of the district attorney and was not protected speech. Garcetti, 547 U.S. 
at 421. 
 31. Id. In Garcetti, the plaintiff was a Los Angeles District Attorney who, after uncovering a 
police affidavit that contained serious misrepresentations, wrote a memorandum to his employer 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/6
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Aside from requiring employees to speak as citizens when reporting 
misconduct of their public employer, the Court in Garcetti was ―divided 
on whether to extend common law protection equally between external 
and internal whistleblowing.‖32 Justice Stevens in his dissent declared that 
the majority‘s refusal to protect speech made by a public employee 
pursuant to his job duties created a ―perverse‖ incentive whereby 
employees might ―bypass their employer-specified channels of resolution 
and voice their concerns in public, namely through the media.‖33 
Thus, Garcetti, Pickering, and Connick demonstrate that protection of 
whistleblower speech is largely contingent on a court‘s fluid interpretation 
of what constitutes a matter of public concern, and what speech might 
disrupt the employer‘s business objectives. Furthermore, these previously 
discussed common law protections, which only protect speech on matters 
of public concern while ignoring speech relating to the workplace, afford 
greater protection to external reports. These cases express a distinct 
preference for external reporting and this tacit encouragement of reports to 
the media stands in direct opposition to the United Kingdom‘s approach to 
whistleblowing addressed in Part II. 
 
 
recommending that the case be dismissed because of the affidavit‘s inaccuracies. Id. at 414. 
 32. See Lobel, supra note 14, at 17. 
 33. Id. at 18. Stevens specifically commented that ―it is senseless to let constitutional protection 
for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description. Moreover, it seems 
perverse to fashion a new rule that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns 
publicly before talking frankly to their superiors.‖ Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427. Employment law scholar 
Lobel concisely and poignantly articulated how the majority and the dissent‘s differing opinions fit 
within the current web of American whistleblower law: 
The majority relied on the ―powerful network of legislative enactments—such as whistle-
blower protection laws and labor code—available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing‖ 
as sufficient to encourage employees to voice their concerns about potential unlawful 
government conduct. The dissent however pointed to the significant limitations of existing 
statutory protections, describing whistleblower law as a ―patchwork, not a showing that 
worries may be remitted to legislatures for relief.‖ In particular, the dissent emphasized that 
. . . internal speech frequently falls outside the statutory and judicial decisions of 
whistleblowing, ―defined in the classic sense of exposing an official‘s fault to a third party or 
to the public.‖  
Lobel, supra note 14, at 19–20. This ―perverse‖ irony was also noted by two American scholars even 
before the Garcetti decision. Callahan and Dworkin concluded that ―a public employee whistleblower 
who directs disclosures to the press may be more likely to receive First Amendment-based protection 
than one who reports internally or to another external outlet.‖ Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 17, at 
159. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had initially granted the Garcetti plaintiff First 
Amendment protection, more vividly described these noted ―perverse incentives‖ of discouraging 
internal reporting: ―To deprive public employees of constitutional protection when they fulfill this 
employment obligation, while affording them protection if they bypass their supervisors and take their 
tales, for profit or otherwise, directly to a scandal sheet or to an internet political smut purveyor defies 
sound reason.‖ Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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C. Statutory Protections for the American Employee 
Statutory provisions are the chief source of American whistleblower 
protection as they offer more specific and explicit protection for those who 
choose to report. Some statutes apply to both private and public sector 
employees while others apply only to public employees.
34
 
1. Protections for Public and Private Employees 
Similar to the common law/judicial protections that were previously 
discussed, statutory whistleblower protection largely favors external 
reporting over internal reporting.
35
 Such statutory whistleblower 
protections come in two different varieties. The first type of statute has 
anti-retaliation provisions that have been ―included in federal statutes 
regulating terms and conditions of employment, such as anti-
discrimination laws, health and safety laws, minimum wage and maximum 
hour laws, and pension laws.‖36 The second type of statute ―protect[s] 
information of concern outside the workplace to the public at large.‖37  
Some examples of the first category of statutes are the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935 (―NLRA‖),38 the Fair Labor Standards Act 
 
 
 34. Bounty statutes, which will not be discussed at length, are another form of whistleblower 
protection that apply to both public and private employees, and explicitly favor external reporting. 
Lobel, supra note 14, at 12. Under these laws, employees can file a ―qui tam suit‖ and receive a 
portion of the money recovered pursuant to their report. A qui tam action, as defined by Black‘s Law 
Dictionary, is ―[a]n action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part 
of which the government or some specific public institution will receive.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 
1282 (8th ed. 2004). For more on qui tam actions, see Michael Cover & Gordon Humphreys, 
Whistleblowing in English Law, in WHISTLEBLOWING: SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 89, 
90–91 (Gerald Vinten ed., 1994); and Lobel, supra note 14 (manuscript at 11). 
 35. Lobel, supra note 14, at 13. 
 36. Estlund, supra note 26, at 117 (footnote omitted).  
 37. Id. For example, a pollution statute which regulates emissions might also have a provision 
within its statutory scheme that prohibits discharge of an employee for reporting a violation of the 
statute. 
 38. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). The whistleblower 
protection appears in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). The Supreme Court has interpreted § 158(a)(4) broadly, 
allowing protection for employees who have not participated in formal NLRB proceedings though the 
employee still has to have had some interaction with an external reporting agency. NLRB v. Scrivener, 
405 U.S. 117 (1972). Scrivener indicates that while the extent to which an employee participates in 
external reporting is not paramount, an employee must still make some contribution to an external 
reporting agency‘s investigation of wrongdoing to be protected under the NLRA‘s whistleblower 
protection section; an internal report alone will not suffice. One potential exception to the requirement 
for external whistleblowing is that non-union employees might receive whistleblower protection if 
speaking out against an employer pursuant to their § 7 rights if they are engaged in a concerted activity 
for employees‘ mutual aid and protection, and are speaking out on conditions of employment. Though 
not specifically related to whistleblowing, this doctrine seems to extend whistleblower protection to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/6
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(―FLSA‖),39 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(―ADEA‖),40 the Occupation Safety and Health Act of 1970 (―OSHA‖),41 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (―Title VII‖).42 These statutes 
generally protect employees when they report to a government agency, i.e. 
externally report.
43
 However, when the statute does not specify whether it 
prefers an internal report or a report to a government agent, the decision 
regarding what types of disclosures will be protected has largely been left 
to the courts. Courts have consistently decided, though, that federal anti-
retaliation statutes should be interpreted broadly to protect both internal 
and external reports.
44
 
The second category of statutes includes the Water Pollution Control 
Act of 1948 or the Clean Water Act (―CWA‖),45 the Clean Air Act of 1955 
 
 
groups of individuals who internally or externally report hazardous work conditions. CRAIN ET AL., 
supra note 8, at 505. See also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). 
 39. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). The whistleblower protections 
appear in 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Courts have interpreted the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA 
differently. ―Most federal courts have concluded that an internal complaint to the employer will satisfy 
the complaint filing requirement of 215(a)(3).‖ CRAIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 744 (citations omitted). 
Others ―have held that a formal complaint to the government agency or a court is required to trigger 
protection.‖ Id. (citing Lambert v. Genesse Hosp., 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 40. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). The 
whistleblower protection is found in 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Section 623(d) has been interpreted similarly 
to the whistleblower protection language of Title VII. The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII 
encompasses an individual‘s complaints to supervisors regardless of whether she also files an EEOC 
charge. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). Thus, it seems that Title VII 
and the ADEA each allow whistleblower protection for employees who report misconduct both 
internally and externally as both of these types of reporting fall within the ―oppose any practice‖ 
language of the statutes. 
 41. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006). The 
whistleblower protection is found in 29 U.S.C. § 660(c). As noted by OSHA scholar, Monique Lillard, 
however, ―the reference to ‗filing‘ a complaint is an obvious reference to external whistleblowing.‖ 
Monique C. Lillard, Exploring Paths to Recovery for OSHA Whistleblowers: Section 11(c) of the and 
the Public Policy Tort, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL‘Y J. 329, 338 (2002). Yet both external and internal 
complaints under the OSHA have received protection. Id. at 339. For an in-depth discussion of the 
reporting mechanisms of the OSHA, see id. at notes 44–54 and accompanying text. 
 42. Title VII‘s whistleblower protections are codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). See supra 
note 40 and accompanying text. 
 43. Lobel, supra note 14, at 14. 
 44. Id. at 14–15. While it is beyond the scope of this article, state whistleblower laws generally 
only protect external reporting. Id. at 14. ―According to a 2006 report of the National Whistleblower 
Center, 58% of state whistleblower laws do not protect internal whistleblowers.‖ Id. at 14 n.63. For a 
larger discussion of internal versus external reporting in the context of state whistleblower statutes, see 
Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower Protection, 51 
ADMIN. L. REV. 581 (1999). 
 45. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). The whistleblower protection is found in 33 U.S.C. § 1367 
(2006). 
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(―CAA‖),46 the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act (―FMHSA‖),47 and the 
infamous Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (―SOX‖).48 These more 
individualized whistleblowing statutes offer varied protection similar to 
the anti-retaliation statutes.  
In sum, both categories of federal whistleblower statutes seem to 
protect employees who make external reports while some only protect 
internal reporting. Moreover, protection for employees who make internal 
reports is often left to the whim of the courts. Regardless, America‘s 
preference for external reporting is once again apparent.
49
 
2. Protection Specifically for the Public Employee 
The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (―WPA‖),50 is the primary 
 
 
 46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006). The whistleblower protection is found in 42 U.S.C. § 7622. 
On their faces, the CWA and CAA do not seem to protect internal whistleblowers. Each statute forbids 
discrimination or adverse employment action against employees for conduct only related to the 
commencing, testifying or assisting (only the CAA includes the word assist) in a proceeding initiated 
under the statute, which requires external reporting to the appropriate agency. But because these 
statutes do not specifically proscribe internal reporting, courts have often protected both internal and 
external reporting under these acts. Lobel, supra note 14, at 14–15. 
 47. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–965 (1977). The whistleblower provision is found in 30 U.S.C. § 815(c). 
 48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The whistleblower 
protection is provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006). SOX prohibits employers from taking adverse 
employment actions with respect to employees who report activity that they reasonably believe is a 
violation of federal securities law. Unlike the aforementioned anti-retaliation statutes, SOX explicitly 
spells out that it protects both internal and external whistleblowers in section 1514A(a). It protects 
disclosures to: ―(A) a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; (B) any Member of Congress or 
any committee of Congress; or (C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee.‖ 
§ 1514A(a)(1). 
 49. Notably, as of 1994, thirty-seven states have enacted statutes that protect whistleblowers and 
the majority of these statutes specifically state what the preferred reporting channel is. The majority of 
these state statutes also prefer external reporting, yet most statutes do not protect disclosures to the 
media. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 17, at 156. These authors comment that ―[n]o statute identifies 
the media as a proper recipient of a whistleblower‘s report, fewer than one-third of the state laws 
protect whistleblowing to the media at any point, and twenty-four states explicitly exclude this form of 
whistleblowing from their coverage.‖ Id. at 157 (footnote omitted). Moreover, 
[R]eporting to the media is encouraged by neither Congress nor state legislatures. Federal 
legislators have been more willing than their counterparts at the state level to allow 
whistleblowers to choose between internal and external outlets. Nevertheless, federal statutes 
that indicated an external preference designated an agency or other governmental body. 
Id. at 158. This distrust of the media will be further illuminated when discussing the British model. 
 50. The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 1201–1222 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). The WPA amended the prior Civil Service Reform 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–454, 92 Stat. 1111, which was the first major piece of federal 
whistleblower legislation. For a good discussion of these acts and their interaction see Thomas M. 
Devine, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation for the Modern Law of Employment 
Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531, 533 (1999).  
 The proceedings under the WPA are largely administrative, and individual whistleblowers have 
no right to bring their claims to federal courts, though they might be able to bring an individual right of 
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federal statute that protects public employee whistleblowers. The WPA 
protects federal employees who report ―information which they reasonably 
believe evidences a violation of law, rule or regulation, a gross waste of 
funds, gross mismanagement, abuse of authority or a substantial and 
specific danger to public health and safety.‖51 While this statute facially 
allows both internal and external reporting, some courts recognize 
exceptions to its protection, which inherently limit the protection afforded 
to many types of internal reports.
52
 
There are two major exceptions provided by the WPA that tend to 
minimize protection for internal reports. First, an employee‘s disclosure is 
not protected if she makes ―a disclosure . . . in the ordinary course of an 
employee‘s duties.‖53 Second, courts occasionally interpret the WPA to 
exclude protection for employees who report to their immediate 
supervisors instead of to a government body that is qualified to hear the 
disclosure.
54
 Therefore, similar to the aforementioned common law 
protection, ―the jurisprudential inconsistency is apparent—whereas many 
courts insist on the significance of the external/internal distinction, other 
courts reject the logic of including internal speech from whistleblower 
statutory protections.‖55 
II. THE BRITISH MODEL 
In stark contrast to the patchwork of protection demonstrated by  
American whistleblower law, whistleblower protections in the United 
Kingdom are governed by a single statute,
56
 which applies to both private 
 
 
action after they have exhausted some administrative remedies. Robert G. Vaughn et al., The 
Whistleblower Statute Prepared for the Organization of American States and the Global Legal 
Revolution Protecting Whistleblowers, 35 GEO. WASH. INT‘L L. REV. 857, 875 (2003). See also Bruce 
D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 355 (1991) for a detailed examination of the WPA and its provisions and shortcomings. 
 51. Vaughn et al., supra note 50, at 874–75 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(1)). In addition to 
providing good background information on the WPA and PIDA, Vaughn‘s article also discusses the 
proposal of a model whistleblower law. While that topic is beyond the scope of this project, it might be 
interesting to compare in-depth my proposed whistleblower law to Vaughn‘s suggested model.  
 52. Lobel, supra note 14, at 15.  
 53. Id. This is commonly referred to as the ―job duty‖ defense and is highly reminiscent of the 
common law protection defined in Garcetti above. Id.; see supra notes 30–31. As mentioned in the 
text, this ―job duty‖ defense has not been universally adopted. See Lobel, supra note 14, at 15 n.71, for 
case law that rejects the ―job duty‖ defense.  
 54. Lobel, supra note 14, at 15.  
 55. Id. at 15–16. 
 56. While the British model‘s single statute might seem to be an improvement over America‘s 
―patchwork,‖ the initial results of PIDA have shown that it, too, might be ineffective in curing the ills 
of whistleblower law. Myers mentions that within the first three years of PIDA‘s enactment, 1,200 
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and public employees.
57
 This Public Interest Disclosure Act
58
 offers a 
tiered-disclosure model, which evinces British distaste for external 
reporting. 
A. Common Law Protection and Early Statutory Laws  
The scant whistleblower protections available at British common law 
emanated from the implied duties of the employment relationship, which 
explicitly barred British employees from publicly discussing private 
employment matters. At common law, while the British employer had an 
implied duty to lend reasonable support in cases where an employee was 
victimized by fellow employees,
59
 British employees also owed a duty of 
loyalty and confidentiality to their employer.
60
 Accordingly, British 
employers at common law often framed whistleblower claims as a breach 
of the employer‘s confidence, or as disloyalty. Agreeing with the 
employer‘s argument, British courts often deemed whistleblowing a 
breach of the employee‘s employment contract,61 giving British employees 
little protection from an adverse employment action if they blew the 
whistle.
 62
  
As evidenced above, like in the American model, British whistleblower 
protection at common law was scant, but the British common law differs 
from its American brother, however, in that it explicitly disfavors external 
reporting except where the disclosure involves serious wrongdoing.
63
 
Specifically, at British common law, only in a case of serious wrongdoing 
coupled with a heightened public interest could an employee breach his 
 
 
claims were filed by whistleblowers alleging some form of victimization. Decisions were reached in 
only 152 of these cases, and over half of these employees did not receive a favorable judgment. Of 
those who won, only half of them actually won under PIDA, the rest won under other employment 
discrimination law. Over two-thirds of the claims brought under PIDA never made it to court. Ann 
Myers, Whistleblowing—The UK Experience, in WHISTLEBLOWING AROUND THE WORLD: LAW, 
CULTURE AND PRACTICE 101, 111 (Richard Calland & Guy Dehn eds., 2004). 
 57. Two British scholars, comparing U.S. whistleblower legislation to British legislation, noted 
that ―[i]n stark contrast to the USA, the UK is a virtual ‗legislative desert‘ when it comes to 
whistleblower statutes.‖ Michael Cover & Gordon Humphreys, Whistleblowing in English Law, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING—SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 89, 93 (Gerald Vinten ed., 1994). 
 58. Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c. 23 (Eng.).  
 59. This essentially provided a whistleblower protection from harassment after making a 
disclosure. Cover & Humphreys, supra note 57, at 94. 
 60. Lucy Vickers, Whistling in the Wind, 20 LEGAL STUD. 428, 430 (2000). 
 61. Id. at 431. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 433. Vickers further explains, ―There is no breach of confidence if serious wrongdoing 
is disclosed, even if commercially sensitive information is involved.‖ Id. at 430 (footnote omitted). 
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duties of confidence and loyalty.
64
 Yet, even this exception was limited in 
the British model as some employees could never externally report, even 
in a case of serious misconduct, if they were contractually obligated to 
report wrongdoing first to their employer, or if they were required to abide 
by a strict professional code of conduct.
65
  
B. The Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998
66
 
The harshness of British common law and its inadequate 
whistleblower protection received national attention in the United 
Kingdom in the 1990s when a series of industrial disasters and a child 
abuse scandal
67
 rocked the country. Reacting to these unfortunate 
tragedies, which feasibly could have been prevented had an employee 
blown the whistle on misconduct he had observed, the United Kingdom 
finally began to enact statutory whistleblower protections.
68
 First, in 1993, 
the United Kingdom founded Public Concern at Work (―PCaW‖) ―to 
tackle whistleblowing.‖69 The goal of this charitable organization was to 
encourage whistleblowers to speak without fear of reprisal.
70
 Next, in 
 
 
 64. Id. Commenting on what issues touch on the public interest, Vickers noted, ―Relevant factors 
[in defining whether an issue touches on the public interest] include the subject matter of and timing of 
the disclosure, the identity of the person to whom disclosure is made, and the motive of the person 
making the disclosure.‖ Id. at 430–31. 
 65. James Gobert & Maurice Punch, Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998, 63 MOD. L. REV. 25, 37 (2000). At common law, the ―duty of confidence 
together with the limitations of the protection against unfair dismissal, demonstrate the inadequacy of 
legal protection available to those who blow the whistle at work.‖ Vickers, supra note 60, at 431 
(footnote omitted). 
 66. For a succinct summary of PIDA and American whistleblower protections, see Vaughn et al., 
supra note 50, at 891–93. 
 67. Such disasters included a ferry capsizing off Zebrugge that killed 193 people, the Piper Alpha 
disaster where an oil platform exploded, killing 167 people, a commuter train crash that killed thirty-
five and injured 500, and large thirteen-year long child abuse scandal.  
In each of these cases, public inquiries were established to uncover what went wrong and 
learn [sic] lessons for the future. In each case it was discovered that staff knew of serious 
problems and either turned a blind eye, were too scared to speak up or tried to raise their 
concerns but to little effect. 
Myers, supra note 56, at 102. See also LUCY VICKERS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EMPLOYMENT 116 
(2002). 
 68. In 1992, Britain enacted the Offshore Safety Act, 1992, c. 15 (Eng.), which was later 
expanded to protect employees who raised concerns about health and safety pursuant to their job as 
safety representatives. Employment Rights Act (ERA), 1996, c.18, §§ 44, 100 (Eng.), cited in Vickers, 
supra note 60, at 431 n.23; VICKERS, supra note 67, at 9. Shortly after this law was introduced, the 
National Health Service also published guidance, which ―confirm[ed] that employees‘ free speech 
should be encouraged because of its role in improving the health service.‖ VICKERS, supra note 67, at 
9 (citing ―Guidance for Staff on Relations with the Public and the Media‖ (1993) NHS Executive). 
 69. Myers, supra note 56, at 104.  
 70. Id.; VICKERS, supra note 67, at 9. The PCaW ―set up a confidential legal helpline to advise 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
736 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:723 
 
 
 
 
1995, following PCaW‘s lead, a British committee recommended the 
introduction of whistleblower laws for public employees
71
 and ―set out 
what it considered the essential elements of an effective internal reporting 
system.‖72 These recommendations by the committee were followed by a 
series of bills in Parliament that ultimately led to the introduction of the 
Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998 (―PIDA‖ or ―Act‖).73 
The Public Interest Disclosure Act, which cemented the British 
preference for internal reporting, was once described as ―one of the most 
far-reaching whistleblower protection laws in the world,‖74 and ―striking 
for the breadth of its coverage.‖75 The legislators‘ primary challenge when 
formulating the Act was achieving the appropriate balance between the 
―rights of employees to speak [and] the interests of employers in 
preserving legitimate confidentiality.‖76 According to one British legal 
scholar, ―PIDA [sought] to achieve this balance by closely defining the 
subject matters on which disclosures [we]re allowed, and by setting out 
 
 
anyone with a concern about malpractice, risk or danger at work . . . [P]ractical advice . . . enable[d] a 
genuine whistleblower to communicate the concern responsibly and to the right people so that a 
serious problem [could] be . . . addressed.‖ Myers, supra note 56, at 104. Officially, the purpose of the 
PCaW was ―[t]o promote ethical standards of conduct and compliance with the law by . . . relevant 
organisations in their administration and management, treatment of personnel, health safety and 
commercial practices and protection of the natural environment.‖ Evelyn Oakley & Anna Myers, The 
UK: Public Concern at Work, in WHISTLEBLOWING AROUND THE WORLD: LAW, CULTURE & 
PRACTICE 169, 171 (Richard Calland & Guy Dehn eds., 2004). The PCaW has the equivalent of only 
six full-time staff members and its helpline is its main avenue for aiding employees since it does not 
litigate whistleblower cases. Id. at 171–72. The PCaW has also worked alongside the Government 
Accountability Project (―GAP‖), which is its United States counterpart. Id. at 177. GAP was founded 
in 1977 and has a staff of thirty full-time or part-time employees and fifty interns and volunteers. Tom 
Devine, The USA: Government Accountability Project, in WHISTLEBLOWING AROUND THE WORLD: 
LAW, CULTURE & PRACTICE 158, 158 (Richard Calland & Guy Dehn eds., 2004). According to 
Devine, ―[i]nitially GAP primarily served as a hotline for personal support and a matchmaking service 
for whistleblowers with kindred spirits and potential allies in Congress or the media,‖ but later became 
a significant lobbying organization for whistleblowers, leading Congress to pass the Civil Service 
Reform Act (―CSRA‖) of 1978. Id. at 159. GAP‘s website, http://www.whistleblower.org, contains a 
summary of the organization‘s recent activity. Id. at 160. 
 71. Myers, supra note 56, at 105; VICKERS, supra note 67, at 10 (citing First Report of the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1995, HMSO Cm 2850 I–II). 
 72. Myers, supra note 56, at 105 (footnote omitted). 
 73. Public Interest Disclosure Act § 1, codified at ERA 1996 § 43J. This bill was initially 
introduced by Richard Shepherd as a private members bill, but it received virtually unanimous support 
in Parliament. VICKERS, supra note 67, at 10. 
 74. Oakley & Myers, supra note 70, at 173. 
 75. See Vaughn et al., supra note 50, at 891. 
 76. Vickers, supra note 60, at 432. Note that these interests, which the Act tries to balance, 
closely resemble the Pickering test established by the United States Supreme Court in 1968. The chief 
difference is that the British law emphasizes protecting employer confidentiality, while the American 
law seeks to allow the employer discretion in managing his workplace.  
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procedures by which disclosure must be made in order to qualify for 
protection.‖77  
PIDA applies to all employees whether private or public, and even to 
independent contractors.
78
 The Act, based on British unfair dismissal law, 
presumes that all dismissals pursuant to making a protected disclosure are 
unfair,
79
 and accordingly the Act grants remedies traditionally available 
under British unfair dismissal law.
80
 Protection under the Act, however, is  
limited and is only granted to specific disclosures relating to: (1) criminal 
offenses, (2) failure by a person to comply with a legal obligation, (3) 
miscarriages of justice, (4) dangers to health and safety, (5) dangers to the 
environment, or (6) concerns that information about one of these matters is 
being deliberately concealed.
81
  
Unlike American law, PIDA also sets up a procedure-laden
82
 ―tiered 
disclosure regime,‖83 where wider disclosures and external reports are 
specifically discouraged. To make external disclosures largely 
unnecessary, the Act aims at encouraging individual workplaces to 
institute their own internal procedures for reporting misconduct.
84
 
Moreover, most internal disclosures pursuant to the Act are automatically 
protected,
85
 allowing for additional safeguards when an employer‘s 
 
 
 77. Id.  
 78. Vickers, supra note 60, at 432–33; Myers, supra note 56, at 107 (citing ERA 1996 § 43K). 
 79. ERA 1996 § 47A. 
 80. These remedies include reinstatement, re-engagement, or compensation. Compensation is 
unlimited. VICKERS, supra note 67, at 153.  
 81. ERA 1996 § 43B. Listing the exclusive types of disclosure that will be protected has the 
advantage of providing greater certainty for employees in knowing what types of disclosure will be 
protected. Adopting this approach has resigned PIDA to a position of limited flexibility, unlike in 
American whistleblower law, since the protected disclosure section in PIDA has no catch-all 
provision. Vickers, supra note 60, at 434. Accordingly, PIDA might not protect disclosures for 
everything that is in the public interest. The holes of PIDA are illuminated when it is compared to the 
WPA, which protects broader categories of disclosure including ―‗gross mismanagement,‘ ‗gross 
waste of funds,‘ and ‗abuse of authority.‘‖ VICKERS, supra note 67, at 155. But depending on 
subsequent court interpretations, the ―failure to comply with a legal obligation,‖ in PIDA § 43B, id., 
might allow protection for other disclosures.  
 82. Lobel, supra note 14, at 53. Lobel contends, ―[S]tudies find that procedural justice has a 
more significant effect on employees‘ willingness to follow rules and is more effective in encouraging 
ethical behavior . . . .‖ Id. Yet Vickers stresses that because there are different procedural requirements 
for the different types of disclosures under PIDA, unless the whistleblower is an experienced lawyer, 
or has consulted with a lawyer, the highly technical PIDA might leave whistleblowers unsure about its 
afforded protection, perhaps chilling whistleblowers. VICKERS, supra note 67, at 173. 
 83. Myers, supra note 56, at 107. 
 84. VICKERS, supra note 67, at 152. 
 85. Id. ―Internal disclosure includes disclosure to the employer, or to a third party where the 
malpractice is caused by that third party or is his legal responsibility.‖ Vickers, supra note 60, at 436 
(citing ERA 1996 § 43C). PIDA also considers an employee‘s disclosure of  misconduct to a ―relevant 
minister of the Crown‖ an internal disclosure. Id. (citing ERA 1996 § 43E). Lobel points out that 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
738 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:723 
 
 
 
 
reputation is at stake.
86
 An employee only has to make a report in good 
faith
87
 and have a reasonable suspicion that wrongdoing has occurred in 
order to receive protection under PIDA.
88
 This heightened protection of 
internal disclosure comports with the aforementioned British common law, 
which protects disclosures as long as there has not been a breach of 
confidence.
89
 
This deleterious effect of breaching employer confidence weighs more 
heavily, though, in the case of external disclosures; therefore, PIDA 
requires that more criteria be met before an external disclosure is granted 
protection under the Act. There are two main types of external disclosures: 
a disclosure made to an ―authorized regulator,‖ and a disclosure made to 
the media or what PIDA deems  a ―wider disclosure.‖  
The main additional other requirement for an external disclosure is that 
such a disclosure has to meet a heightened standard of suspicion. 
Generally, an external disclosure ―is only protected where the worker acts 
 
 
British law‘s prioritization of internal disclosure in this manner ―allows the British law to define other 
thresholds more broadly, at the same time as it provides strong protection against retaliation when an 
employee chooses the internal path.‖ Lobel, supra note 14, at 51. Moreover, Lobel concludes that 
―[b]y emphasizing internal problem-solving over top-down government enforcement, the British 
approach of internal reporting sends a message of a culture of compliance that can be created and 
maintained within corporations.‖ Id. 
 86. VICKERS, supra note 67, at 158. Noting that this part of the Act is pro-employer the author 
suggests, ―To a large extent [the statute is pro-employer] because if the concern turns out to be 
unfounded, no damage is likely to have been done to the external reputation of the organisation as the 
matter will have remained internal to it.‖ Id. at 157–58. According to Vickers: 
The balance between the wider public interest in preventing wrongdoing, and the employer‘s 
interest in protecting the internal reputation of staff and preventing the waste of staff time, is 
probably struck in the right place here. Protection is given to those with reasonable suspicions 
but not to those who just spread rumors. 
Id. at 158. 
 87. Some legal scholars suggest that PIDA‘s ―good faith‖ standard might be a trap. Gobert and 
Punch allege: ―Experience has shown that organisations are adept at getting back at those whom it 
regards as troublemakers . . . . Unsuspecting and naïve workers thus may be led down a turbulent path 
by PIDA that will result in considerable personal suffering, and perhaps to little avail.‖ Gobert & 
Punch, supra note 65, at 48–49. 
 88. ERA 1996 §§ 43B, 43C. Vickers surmises that:  
The employee does not need to believe that the wrongdoing has definitely occurred, but does 
need to believe that the evidence suggests that it has. . . . The reporting of mere rumours is not 
protected, but an employee is enabled to report genuine concerns or suspicions without 
needing to wait for proof . . . . 
VICKERS, supra note 67, at 157. ―Good faith‖ refers to ―an honest belief in the truth of an allegation.‖ 
Gobert & Punch, supra note 65, at 40. Yet, it might prove difficult to conceptualize ―good faith‖ in a 
hearing, perhaps leading to decreased whistleblower action for fear that their motives might be 
questioned. Id. at 41. Interestingly, when an employee is reporting a violation of health and safety he 
need not be reporting in ―good faith.‖ Id.  
 89. VICKERS, supra note 67, at 159; Vickers, supra note 60, at 436. 
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in the reasonable belief that the information disclosed and any allegations 
made are substantially true.‖90  
Specifically, the first type of external disclosure to an ―authorized 
regulator‖91 must meet this heightened standard of suspicion; a standard 
that ensures that regulatory bodies are not subjected to countless spurious 
claims, while guaranteeing that employees are not subjected to an adverse 
employment action for reporting misconduct that is clearly within the 
scope of the body‘s regulatory and investigatory powers.92  
When making the second type of external disclosure to the media, the 
police, Members of Parliament (―MPs‖), unions, or any other external 
body with an interest in the misconduct,
93
 the whistleblower has to meet 
additional criteria, which effectively deter employees from making these 
wider disclosures.
94
 To receive protection when making a wider 
disclosure, first, the employee‘s  allegations must have been made in good 
faith with a reasonable belief that they are true, and the disclosure must 
not be made for the purpose of personal gain.
95
 Second, the employee must 
have first tried to raise the concern internally or with a prescribed 
regulatory body.
96
 However, protection will still be granted without such a 
prior report if the employee reasonably believes that he will be victimized 
if he makes the disclosure internally, if he reasonably believes that 
evidence will be destroyed or concealed if raised internally, or if there is 
no regulatory body with whom to raise the concern. Finally, in addition to 
 
 
 90. VICKERS, supra note 67, at 162 (citing ERA 1996 § 43G(1)(b)). Elaborating on the 
requirements for external disclosure, Vickers contends, ―External disclosure of a bare suspicion would 
not be protected; the worker must believe that the allegation is actually true, and have reasonable 
grounds for that belief. Supporting evidence is probably necessary.‖ Id.  
 91. Under the Public Disclosure Order 1999, specific regulatory bodies were mentioned 
including the Financial Services Authority, the Health and Safety Executive, and the Commissioners 
of the Inland Revenue, but this list is not exclusive nor exhaustive. Vickers, supra note 60, at 437 
(citing the Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) Order 1999 (SI 1999/1549)).  
 92. VICKERS, supra note 67, at 164. 
 93. Vickers, supra note 60, at 437 (citing ERA 1996 § 43G). 
 94. VICKERS, supra note 67, at 164. Section 43H requires that ―[w]here the matter disclosed is of 
an exceptionally serious nature, PIDA removes most of the preconditions to protection, in recognition 
that the public interest can override most other interests.‖ Id. at 171 (citing ERA 1996 § 43H). 
 95. ―Because the term ‗personal‘ and not ‗pecuniary‘ gain is used, Parliament may have 
envisaged other types of indirect benefits to the informant or his family in addition to direct cash 
payments . . . .‖ Gobert & Punch, supra note 65, at 44. This provision, however, is probably chiefly 
directed at ―chequebook journalism.‖ VICKERS, supra note 67, at 165. 
 96. Gobert and Punch assert:  
If the benefits of establishing internal whistleblowing procedures were not by now already 
apparent to employers, [PIDA] adds a further inducement to their creation by identifying 
compliance with internal procedures as one of the factors to be considered in evaluating the 
reasonableness of a whistleblower‘s decision to go public. 
Gobert & Punch, supra note 65, at 45 (footnote omitted). 
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meeting these requirements, the disclosure must be reasonable
97
 under the 
circumstances.
98
 
Because of these strict requirements for wider disclosures, reports to 
the media will very rarely be protected under PIDA.
99
 
III. INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL REPORTING: IS THERE ―ONE RIGHT PATH‖? 
The chosen method of disclosure has a wide-ranging impact on the 
protection afforded and the institution‘s response to the whistleblower and 
his report. There are costs and benefits to each method of reporting 
demonstrating that there is not ―one right path‖ when blowing the whistle. 
Below I will delineate the reasons why an employee might choose to 
report internally versus externally. 
A. The Internal Report 
A whistleblower often speaks out to get his organization ―back on 
track.‖100 Accordingly, most whistleblowers choose to report misconduct 
internally since they believe that this type of report will better target the 
ills of their workplace, and that this type of report will be less likely to end 
 
 
 97. Section 43(G)(3) specifically delineates factors that will be considered when deciding if an 
external disclosure should be protected under PIDA. These factors include the identity of the person to 
whom disclosure is made; the seriousness of the failure; whether the failure is continuing; whether 
disclosure is made in breach of a duty of confidence owed by the employer to another; whether an 
internal disclosure has been made and whether any action was taken by the employer or the relevant 
regulatory body; and, where there has been an initial internal disclosure, whether the worker had 
complied with internal whistleblowing procedures. ERA 1996 § 43(G)(3). Generally, the more serious 
the misconduct that is being reported, the more likely external reporting will be seen as reasonable. 
Vickers, supra note 60, at 438 (citing Lion Laboratories Ltd. v. Evans, [1985] 1 Q.B. 526). Vickers 
specified, ―The decision on the reasonableness of external disclosure is really the only area of the 
PIDA that is open to the discretion of the tribunal or court . . . . Other issues . . . could all be 
considered by a tribunal after it had given particular regard to the matters listed.‖ VICKERS, supra note 
67, at 170.  
 98. Id. at 164–65 (citing ERA 1996 § 43(G)). Section 43(G) ―reflects the concern that disclosures 
on a wider scale should not be justified too readily, because they are more likely to be damaging to the 
employer‘s interests.‖ Id. at 165. 
 99. VICKERS, supra note 67, at 169. 
 100. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 17, at 166. Thus, whistleblowing can be seen as a ―pro-
social act‖ of the employee. Id. However, Gobert and Punch noted that ―[a]ny legal protection offered 
the whistleblower by PIDA may pale in comparison to the social pressures not to whistleblow.‖ Id. at 
48. Generally, the main reason that whistleblowers have been unwilling to report misconduct is 
because they fear reprisal. Research ―indicates that many employees who observe wrongdoing do not 
report it, that many of those who do so perceive employer retaliation, albeit of a comparatively mild 
variety, and that many of those who do not report wrongdoing attribute their unwillingness to speak 
out to the fear of retaliation.‖ Estlund, supra note 26, at 120. 
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in sanction.
101
 Employers also often prefer internal reports since these 
reports ―prevent the negative publicity, investigations, and administrative 
and legal actions that usually ensue after external whistleblowing.‖102 An 
internal report also allows the institution an opportunity to correct its 
misconduct earlier. Finally, an internal report allows the focus of the 
disclosure to be on the message as opposed to the messenger, further 
ensuring whistleblower anonymity and corporate efficiency in fixing the 
problem.
103
 
B. The External Report 
Why, then, would a whistleblower ever report externally if an internal 
report is preferred by the whistleblower and his employer? Generally, 
research has shown that whistleblowers resort to external reporting only 
when employees believe that internal reports would be futile,
104
 or when 
 
 
 101. Id. Summarizing the risk of reporting to the employees, Lobel notes: 
[W]illingness of employees to put themselves and their company at risk by external reporting 
is rare. Internal voice, on the other hand, offers a way to address possible illicit revelations 
while recognizing uncertainty. It allows open discussion and inquiry without immediate fear 
of sanction. The keystone of external whistleblowing is recovery, while the focus on internal 
processes is good governance. 
Lobel, supra note 14, at 28. 
 102. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 
AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 242 (1987). 
 103. Id. Myers, in Whistleblowing-The UK Experience, often praised British law for emphasizing 
the message rather than the messenger. She thinks that focus on the messenger, e.g. Time magazine‘s 
featuring three American whistleblowers as ―Persons of the Year,‖ ―can obfuscate and diminish the 
message.‖ Myers, supra note 56, at 117. See supra notes 1–2. The British approach to whistleblowing 
seeks to shift the focus of whistleblowing from the messenger to the message in order to ―tak[e] the 
‗heat out of‘‖ whistleblowing. Richard Calland & Guy Dehn, Conclusion: Whistleblowing Around the 
World, in WHISTLEBLOWING AROUND THE WORLD: LAW, CULTURE AND PRACTICE 199, 201 (Richard 
Calland & Guy Dehn eds., 2004). 
 104. Lobel, supra note 14, at 49. This futility is ―either because of the gravity and global 
involvement of the corporation or because previous attempts to report were ignored.‖ Id. Callahan & 
Dworkin, supra note 17, at 170–80 (discussing results of research on employees‘ whistleblowing 
tendencies). Calland and Dehn succinctly summarize the balance sought by PIDA in protecting 
internal disclosures more vigorously: 
At [PIDA‘s] heart lies a core deal: that in return for the whistleblower making the disclosure 
internally first, the organisation will take the message seriously and not harm the messenger. 
When, in the absence of any guidance, whistles are blown externally first or concerns are not 
raised then unjustified harm can be done to the reputation of the organisation and those it 
serves. . . .  
 There are significant benefits for the organisation in a system in which the whistle is not, 
therefore, in the first instance blown externally and employees have an alternative to silence. 
The corresponding benefit for the employee is that the stakes are lower and that a calmer, less 
intimidating environment is available for him or her to make the disclosure. But this, in turn, 
is premised on the organisation not only taking whistleblowing seriously, but having 
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they believe that their employer‘s internal reporting procedure is 
inherently unfair.
105
 Specifically, a whistleblower is likely to make an 
external report: (1) where the organization depends on the misconduct that 
is the subject of the disclosure;
106
 (2) when the offender is a high-ranking 
employee in the organization;
107
 and (3) where the workplace is known to 
be hostile to dissent.
108
 Thus, since a whistleblower often has no choice 
but to report externally, despite the preference for internal reporting, a 
model whistleblower law would afford protection to both types of reports. 
IV. FUSING THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH MODELS 
I propose that fusing the American and British whistleblower 
protection models would most effectively balance the public interest and 
an employer‘s need to control his workplace, and would more 
appropriately protect internal and external reports than either model alone. 
First, a model whistleblower protection law would more closely resemble 
the United Kingdom‘s PIDA. As described above, American 
whistleblower protections emanate from myriad sources including statutes, 
tort law, and the Constitution, making the law, in itself, not uniform and 
hard to find. Moreover, the protections each American source affords the 
whistleblower are often dependent upon whether the employee is a private 
 
 
sufficient commitment to the idea, with a longer term vision in mind, to re-shape the internal 
culture so as to reflect the new ―common interest‖ that is expressed in [PIDA].  
Calland & Dehn, supra note 103, at 201. 
 105. Lobel, supra note 14, at 49. Lobel contends, ―When an internal reporting procedure is viewed 
as effective and fair by employees, employees are more likely to exercise individual dissent rather than 
opt for external reporting.‖ Id. Underscoring this point, Callahan and Dworkin cited the philosopher 
Frederick Elliston who said that, ―dedicated and highly principled employee[s] . . . will not embarrass 
the company by washing their [sic] dirty linen in public.‖ Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 17, at 165 
(quoting FREDERICK ELLISTON, JOHN KEENAN, PAULA LOCKHART & JANE VAN SCHAICK, 
WHISTLEBLOWING 135–38 (1985)).  
 106. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 17, at 165.  
 107. Id. Examining the tendencies of the workplace, the authors assert that: 
When a practice is questioned, there is commonly a tendency to respond with ―retrospective 
rationality‖ and a marshalling of forces to justify the challenged decisions. The flow of 
information may be restricted, and there may be attempts to ―kill the messenger.‖ The 
wrongdoer‘s success in resisting change, suppressing information, and retaliating depends on 
his or her organizational influence. Thus, when the wrongdoing involves powerful 
individuals, the whistleblower is more likely to make disclosures to an external recipient, 
such as a reporter, who is perceived to have clout. 
Id. at 165–66 (footnotes omitted). 
 108. Id. at 166. The authors continue, ―[O]rganizations . . . may establish written policies favoring 
such communication, conduct surveys or internal audits, hire ombudspersons, or install hotlines or 
suggestion boxes. If there are few meaningful avenues for dissent, a history of retaliation, or both, 
employees will perceive that there is little utility in blowing the whistle internally.‖ Id. at 166. This 
article also mentions two studies‘ empirical findings to support this data. See id. at 169–79.  
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sector or public sector employee. In contrast, the British model has one 
statute that covers all employees. A model law should have a single source 
of protection so that an employee can know where to look to see if his 
speech is protected. 
Second, my proposed statute would adopt the American definition of 
―public concern‖109 and would protect disclosures made pursuant to it. 
Under the British model, i.e. PIDA, only six types of disclosures are 
afforded protection and there is no catch-all provision.
110
 A model law that 
adopts the broad American approach to what is a matter of public concern, 
would allow for greater judicial interpretation of the term, and thus would 
allow the definition to morph as values and mores change over time.  
Third, my proposed model whistleblower law would explicitly 
announce its preference for internal or external reporting. I believe the best 
way to accomplish this goal would be to follow the tiered-disclosure 
regime of PIDA, but with some modifications. Internal reports should be 
given almost automatic protection. This preference for internal disclosure 
will not only diminish the incidence of reprisal against whistleblowers, but 
will also promote good corporate governance and ensure effective 
resolution of the reported misconduct.  
While internal disclosures should be granted greater protection than 
external disclosures, a model law should have fewer preconditions to 
external disclosure protection than the British model. However, I would 
keep PIDA‘s requirement that an external disclosure should be made with 
a reasonable belief that the allegations are substantially true, as this will 
weed out spurious claims. Similarly, PIDA‘s requirement that the 
disclosure not be made for personal gain should be kept, since it will 
discourage whistleblowing for profit.  
However, the two additional preconditions that exist under British law, 
that the report first be made internally and that the disclosure must be 
reasonable under the circumstances, should be incorporated into one 
precondition under the proposed model law. After an employee has made 
an allegation with a reasonable belief that it is substantially true, the 
employee‘s report should be protected as long as it was reasonable to 
report it externally. The availability and plausibility of reporting the matter 
 
 
 109. Recall that the American approach either has broad and expansive terms or categories which 
define what a significant public interest or public concern is, as in the WPA, and that in constitutional 
cases courts weigh the employer‘s interest in speaking on a matter of public concern against the 
employer‘s interest in controlling his workplace. 
 110. Despite its flaws, scholars have noted that PIDA has started a ―quiet revolution.‖ Calland & 
Dehn, supra note 103, at 202. According to Myers, a survey in 2002 discovered that half of the 
randomly selected employers had a whistleblowing policy in place. Myers, supra note 56, at 114.  
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internally can easily be incorporated into this reasonableness test.
111
 
Moreover, this more loosely defined precondition will eliminate some of 
the technical aspects of the British model, allowing for easier compliance 
with the law and less deterrence of good faith whistleblowers. 
Finally, under a model law, wider disclosures to the media should be 
treated completely differently. A model law should allow for disclosure to 
the media, but only if an internal report and an external report have proven 
to be ineffective. This type of proposed provision accounts for the 
American and British distaste for wider disclosure and ensures that an 
organization‘s dirty laundry will not be broadcasted too hastily, while still 
allowing the media to check ineffective corporate governance.  
I acknowledge that there are several arguments against my proposed 
fusion model law. Mainly, one could argue that this type of model would 
create conflict of law issues,
112
 that it might be too cumbersome,
113
 and 
that its definition of ―public concern‖ would be overly broad.114 While 
these are valid arguments, I propose that the benefits of the proposed 
model law would far outweigh any of these costs.
115
  
V. CONCLUSION 
As this Note demonstrates, the American and British models of 
whistleblower law are very different with respect to what they protect, 
how they protect it, and the preferred avenue of reporting. While each 
system has beneficial elements, the American and British models each 
 
 
 111. PIDA actually looks twice to whether the report could have been made internally, once as a 
second precondition, and once as it relates to reasonableness. See Vickers, supra note 60, and Gobert 
& Punch, supra note 96. 
 112. Perhaps the reason why the United States has not enacted a model like the one I have 
proposed here is because of potential conflict of law issues. A uniform statute like the one proposed 
would conflict with the countless whistleblower statutes and common law doctrines that have been 
discussed. Perhaps the best solution to this problem would be to include in my proposed model law a 
provision which states that ―this law supersedes any prior whistleblower law,‖ thus mitigating any 
potential conflicts. 
 113. As mentioned previously, scholars have noted that British employees who attempt to employ 
PIDA are often confused regarding what actions they should take. Vickers noted that the statute was 
almost impossible for a employee to traverse without the aid of a lawyer. See supra note 82. However, 
while a procedure-laden doctrine might be procedurally difficult, it can be no more difficult than 
interpreting America‘s current ―patchwork‖ of protections. 
 114. While this open-endedness might be criticized as providing little to no guidance to 
whistleblowers regarding what disclosures are protected, the trade-off of having a defined set of 
protected disclosures would prove to be far more unworkable and deleterious to the public interest. 
The definition of what is in the public interest or what is a public concern must be able to change over 
time or else the law will not adequately protect whistleblowers down the line. 
 115. See supra notes 112–14 for my responses to the proposed counter-arguments. 
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have flaws. A combination of the two models would better serve to protect 
the whistleblower, which should be a greater priority.  
Applying the aforementioned changes to American and British 
whistleblower law, as proposed in my model law, will mitigate the 
harmful aspects of America‘s patchwork and Britain‘s technical statute, 
and will achieve the right balance of protection for both internal and 
external reporting. While my proposed model law does not suggest ―one 
right path,‖ it offers a more appropriate roadmap for whistleblower 
protection. The procedural signposts and the protection afforded to 
internal and external reports in my model law will better ensure that a 
whistleblower will not find herself at a dead end when choosing her 
avenue of reporting. 
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